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COMMENTS
PERCEPTIBLE COMPETITIVE IMPACT-
IT'S THE NEXT BEST THING TO
SELLING THERE:
JIM WALTER CORP. v. FTC
Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes the acquisition of the
stock or assets of one person by another person when the combina-
tion which results may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly "in any line of commerce or in any activity af-
fecting commerce in any section of the country. ' The intent of
, Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added), as amended by Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6, 94 Stat. 1157 (original version at ch.
323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
Id. Two significant amendments to section 7 have been the Celler-Kefauver amendment, ch.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), and the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349,
§ 6, 94 Stat. 1157. The Celler-Kefauver amendment was enacted to stem a rising tide of
economic concentration through corporate mergers and acquisitions. See S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52
COLUM. L. R.v. 766, 767-68 (1952). Neither the original section 7 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), nor the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), were effective deter-
rents to such combinations. See Note, supra, at 768-69. The original section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act proscribed acquisitions of stock, but not of assets. See id. Furthermore, according to
the House Report accompanying the Celler-Kefauver amendment, it was unclear whether
section 7 proscribed nonhorizontal mergers. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1949). The Sherman Act, although it effectively curbed monopolization and restraints of
trade, was not available to prevent incipient tendencies towards monopoly. See Note, supra,
at 768. The Celler-Kefauver amendment broadened section 7 to include both stock and as-
set acquisitions, see id. at 770; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 Htnv. L. REv. 226, 234 (1960), and impliedly extended section 7 to cover
all types of mergers and acquisitions: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. See H.R. REP.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
Recently, the Antitrust Improvements Act amended section 7 in two respects. The
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the section is to forestall incipient monopolistic tendencies, 2 and it
operates by invalidating acquisitions or mergers whose probable
present or future result is anticompetitive s
As a prerequisite to establishing a violation of the Act, section
7 requires that the government define a relevant product mar-
amendment substituted "person" for "corporation" in the text of section 7, thereby ex-
tending the section's sanctions to noncorporate entities. See H.R. REP. No. 96-871, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). Additionally, the amendment inserted the words "or in any activity
affecting commerce" after "commerce" each time that word appears in the first three
paragraphs of section 7. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6, 94
Stat. 1157. Thus, the amendment overruled United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance
Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), which held that section 7 jurisdiction does not attach unless
both the acquired and the acquiring companies are engaged in interstate commerce. See
United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1975); H.R. REP.
No. 96-871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). The Antitrust Improvements Act does not alter
the substantive standard of section 7, however; courts should "continue to examine whether
the effect of ... [an] acquisition 'may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.'" H.R. REP. No. 96-871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
2 S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The Act's objective of forestalling incip-
ient monopolistic tendencies was reiterated by Congress during its consideration of the Cel-
ler-Kefauver amendment. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); H.R. REP.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
3 Section 7 prohibits acquisitions or mergers whose effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), as amended by Antitrust Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6, 94 Stat. 1157. The words "may be" do not refer to "the mere
possibility but only to the reasonable probability" of a substantial lessening of competition.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950); see United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1974). Certainty of injury to competition, however, need not be
proved. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 622-23; Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). Moreover, substantial lessening of competition may
be established by postacquisition evidence. See 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRusT LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION § 11.07[1] (1980). But cf. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 504-05 (1974) (probative value of postacquisition evidence showing absence of an-
ticompetitive effects is limited). Additionally, in deciding a section 7 case, the court must
predict the impact of the merger on present and future competition, since, "[i]f the enforce-
ment of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional
policy of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated." FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
In assessing the competitive effects of a merger, factors considered significant by the
Justice Department include the size of the industry and of the merging firms, the number of
companies in the industry, rank in the industry of the merging firms, barriers to entry to the
industry, whether the industry is growing or declining, dynamic or stable, the effect of the
merger on suppliers of raw materials and on patterns of distribution of the finished product,
and whether competition generally may be significantly reduced. The Antitrust Aspect of
Mergers, Address by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., to the New York Chapter of
the Public Relations Society of America (September 30, 1954), reprinted in [1971] 1 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4270.16, at 6455. For a thorough discussion of these and other factors
considered by the courts, see 3 J. VON KALINOWSI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 19.02[1]-[13] (1980).
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ket-the "line of commerce" 4-and a relevant geographic mar-
ket-the "section of the country" within which substantial an-
ticompetitive effects are or will be demonstrable. Traditionally, a
relevant geographic market has been defined as the area in which
the relevant goods or services are marketed and where consumers
may obtain supplies.8 Recently, however, in Jim Walter Corp. v.
' See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1957). The
relevant product market generally encompasses those goods or services which reasonably
can be interchanged by consumers. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-25
(1962); see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS
246 (1968). Product characteristics which assist in defining a relevant product market in-
clude the unique properties and uses of the product, specialized manufacturing techniques,
identifiable and fixed vendors and clientele, and a price unaffected by that charged for other
products. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co.
v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The relevant product market generally includes both
a product and its substitutes, although it does not necessarily encompass all substitutes.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953). "The circle
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which.., only a limited number
of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose 'cross-elasticities of demand' are
small." Id. Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (suffi-
cient pricing and end use differences exist between aluminum wire and copper wire to place
them in separate relevant product markets) with United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964) (glass and metal containers are interchangeably used for packaging in cer-
tain industries and thus are within the same relevant product market). For a more thorough
discussion of relevant product market criteria, see 3 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION § 18.03[1]-[2] (1980).
8 United States v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957); see United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962). Only after the relevant markets are established can the
court proceed to the second phase, an assessment of whether the merger or acquisition may
substantially lessen competition within these markets. See United States v. Marine Bancor-
poration, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324
(1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957). See also 2
J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 15.04[2] n.12 (1980). In
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), the Court implied that a substan-
tial lessening of competition in violation of section 7 could be proved without first establish-
ing a relevant geographic market. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549
(1966). The concurring opinions in Pabst strongly opposed such a standard. See id. at 555
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 562 (Fortes, J., concurring). Marine Bancorporation, how-
ever, expressly dispelled the Pabst inference that substantial lessening of competition could
be proved without first defining a relevant geographic market. See United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 n.20 (1974).
' See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974); 2 J.
VON KALINowsKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 15.04[2] (1980). Several tests
have been utilized to further delineate the area of operations constituting the relevant geo-
graphic market. Although it is not charted by "metes and bounds," United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966), it must be an economically significant region, Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962), and it is limited to the area where
the acquired firm conducts significant marketing efforts for its goods and services. United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 (1974). Moreover, it is clearly the
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FTC,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the traditional
notion of a relevant geographic market, holding that it may be de-
fined as either the area where the acquired firm makes significant
sales, or where the acquired firm has a perceptible competitive im-
pact on the pricing and marketing strategies of other firms within
its product market."
Involved in Jim Walter Corp. was the acquisition of the stock
of Panacon Corporation (Panacon) by Celotex Corporation (Celo-
tex), a Jim Walter Corporation (JWC) subsidiary.9 Both JWC and
Panacon, acting through their subsidiaries, marketed tar and
asphalt roofing materials.10 Prior to the acquisition, JWC claimed
an 8.83% market share of domestic sales of such products, and
Panacon an 8.79% share.1 Nationally, JWC was the fifth largest
producer and Panacon was sixth, although 93% of Panacon's sales
were concentrated in twenty-six states. 2 A substantial proportion
of JWC's tar and asphalt roofing materials were distributed in the
same twenty-six states. 3 After the acquisition, JWC possessed a
17.62% share of the national market and was the second largest
producer nationwide.'4
In 1973, the FTC commenced an investigation of the acquisi-
tion and subsequently issued a complaint charging that the acqui-
sition violated section 7.15 In an administrative hearing, the FTC
held that the relevant geographic market comprised the entire
United States and ordered JWC to divest itself of the Panacon di-
vision which produced tar and asphalt roofing materials.'6 JWC
moved for reconsideration of the divestiture order and, upon de-
area of "effective competition" between the acquiring and acquired firms. Tampa Elec. Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1961) (antitrust action under section 3 of the
Clayton Act).
7 625 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1980).
8 Id. at 682.
9 Id. at 678.
10 JWC marketed tar and asphalt roofing products through Celotex, while Panacon
marketed these products through Philip Carey, a Panacon division. Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 678, 681.
13 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Jim Walter Corp. v. FTC, 625 F.2d 676 (5th Cir; 1980).
14 625 F.2d at 678.
15 Id.
"6 Id. at 679. At hearings before an administrative law judge, two relevant geographic
markets were established, the entire United States and the twenty-six state region where
Panacon marketed the bulk of its products, but on appeal to the full commission, only a
national geographic market was found. Id.
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nial of that motion, appealed to the Fifth Circuit.1
The substantive issue on appeal18 was whether the relevant ge-
ographic market was, in fact, nationwide, or restricted to the
twenty-six state region within which Panacon sold the bulk of its
products. 9 To resolve this question, the court first looked to the
definition of a relevant geographic market formulated by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc. 20 In
Marine Bancorporation, the relevant geographic market was de-
fined as the area in which the acquired firm directly com-
petes-where it makes significant sales or markets goods or ser-
vices to a significant degree.2 1 Rejecting a narrow reading of this
definition on the ground that it would be inconsistent with the leg-
islative history of the amended section 7,2 the Jim Walter Corp.
17 Id.
11 A threshold procedural issue in Jim Walter Corp. was whether the FTC had jurisdic-
tion over the action. Id. Prior to the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
349, § 6, 94 Stat. 1157, a jurisdictional prerequisite to actions under paragraph one of sec-
tion 7 was that both the acquired and the acquiring firms be engaged in interstate com-
merce. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-76
(1975); note 1 supra. JWC, a holding company, argued that it was not engaged in interstate
commerce since it acted only through its subsidiaries. 625 F.2d at 680. The Fifth Circuit,
however, found that because section 7 was directed at proscribing the anticompetitive activ-
ities of holding companies, it would be "illogical" to suggest that the commercial activities
of a subsidiary cannot be imputed to its parent for section 7 purposes. Id. Otherwise, hold-
ing companies could never be defendants in section 7 actions. Id.
A second jurisdictional objection raised by JWC was that the commission did not have
jurisdiction over it because Celotex was an indispensable but unjoined party to the proceed-
ings. Id. at 681. Addressing the objection, the court held that the question of indispensabil-
ity is not jurisdictional, and that, in any case, the court may retain jurisdiction as long as
joinder is made before a final decision is handed down. Id.
1 625 F.2d at 678.
o Id. at 681 (citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618-21
(1974)).
21 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974). In Marine
Bancorporation, both the acquiring and acquired corporations were banks. Id. at 606-07.
The acquiring corporation was based in Seattle, Washington and had no branches in Spo-
kane. Id. The acquired corporation, on the other hand, operated solely in Spokane. Id. at
607. The Supreme Court found that the Spokane metropolitan area was the appropriate
relevant geographic market because that was the region within which the acquired firm mar-
keted its services to a significant degree and directly competed against other firms. Id. at
620-23.
22 625 F.2d at 682 (quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950)). The Senate
Report accompanying the Celler-Kefauver amendment advised that:
[A]lthough the section of the country in which there may be a lessening of compe-
tition will normally be one in which the acquired company or the acquiring com-
pany may do business, the bill is broad enough to cope with a substantial lessen-
ing of competition in any other section of the country as well.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
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court concluded that the Marine Bancorporation test sanctioned a
broad relevant geographic market encompassing the acquired
firm's area of significant competition.2 3 This area, according to the
court, is either where significant sales are made by the acquired
firm, or alternatively, where its sales and other marketing activities
have a "perceptible competitive impact" on the marketing strate-
gies of other firms.24 This latter market, the court stated, may be
measured either by "statistical evidence of pricing interdepen-
dence" between geographic areas, or by nonstatistical evidence of
regional market interrelatedness. 2 5
In adopting the perceptible competitive impact test, it is sub-
mitted that the Fifth Circuit has augmented antitrust law with a
new and useful standard by which a relevant geographic market
may be defined. Nevertheless, it appears that two significant fac-
tors-a possible conflict with Supreme Court precedent and
problems of proof-militate against general acceptance of the per-
ceptible competitive impact standard. Unlike the significant sales
test, which is a relatively objective standard for defining the geo-
graphic market,28 the perceptible competitive impact test requires
a more subjective inquiry into the competitive effects of the acqui-
sition in issue.27 Although such inquiry is not foreign to traditional
section 7 analysis, prior to Jim Walter Corp. it had been reserved
for the second tier of such analysis-the determination of whether
there had been a substantial lessening of competition in the
predefined market.28 Indeed, the perceptible competitive impact
1 625 F.2d at 682.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 682-83. Having ascertained the test of a relevant geographic market, the Fifth
Circuit turned to the question of whether the factual predicate required to sustain the FTC
finding of a national market had been established. Judging that a nationwide relevant geo-
graphic market based on perceptible competitive impacts was not supported by substantial
evidence, the court concluded that the merger should not have been analyzed within the
context of such a relevant market. Id. at 683. Thus, it vacated the district court decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
26 The significant-sales test typically involves a determination of market-share. See,
e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1974); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621, 643 app. (1974). Market-share, in the con-
text of delineating a relevant geographic market, is equivalent to the percentage of sales of
the relevant product which a firm commands in a particular region. See generally Kintner &
Postol, A Review of the Law of Horizontal Mergers, 66 GEo. L.J. 1405, 1442-43 (1978).
27 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21, 623-42
(1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-98 (1974). In measuring
the substantiality of anticompetitive effects, a second tier inquiry, see note 5 supra, it is
19811
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test is facially analogous to the doctrine of potential competition
which has been employed to assess the competitive effects of, inter
alia, geographic market extension mergers.29 By definition, a geo-
graphic market extension merger is the combination within the
same relevant product market of firms operating in different geo-
graphic markets.30 Even though, in such a situation, the substitu-
tion of the acquiring firm for the acquired firm will not affect the
concentration of the market 1 nor will it necessarily affect the in-
necessary to review "economic and historical" factors. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 329 (1962). One such factor is a trend toward concentration in the industry. See
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276-78 (1966). Market-share, however, is
also vital in determining substantiality. In United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964), the Court stated that market-shares are the "primary indicia" of market power.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964). See generally 3 J. VON
KALINowsKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TmRE REGULATION § 19.01[3] (1980).
" The potential competition doctrine serves to invalidate an acquisition by a company
which operates outside of the relevant product or geographic markets, yet is "so situated as
to be a potential competitor and likely to exercise substantial influence on market behav-
ior." United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1973); see Comment,
The Potential Competition Doctrine After Marine Bancorporation, 63 GEO. L.J. 969, 969
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Potential Competition]. The doctrine is useful only when the
market structure of the firms operating in the relevant market may be characterized as
oligopolistic, since potential entrants do not influence pricing behavior in a truly competi-
tive market. Potential Competition, supra, at 971; see United States v. Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1974). Potential competition analysis contemplates whether
the acquiring firm is either an actual potential entrant or is perceived as a potential entrant
into the market of the acquired firm. See generally Potential Competition, supra, at 970-75;
Comment, Antitrust: The Supreme Court Recognizes "Economic Realities" in the Banking
Industry, 59 MINN. L. Rlv. 609, 617 (1975). The actual potential entrant theory considers
whether deconcentration of the relevant market would result if an outside acquiring firm
were prevented from entering the market other than by de novo entry or through a toe-hold
acquisition. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973); United States v. First
Nat'l State Bancorporation, 479 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (D.N.J. 1979). The perceived potential
entrant theory looks to whether the acquired firm exerts a favorable influence on competi-
tion within the relevant market by being perceived by firms within that market as a likely
de nova entrant. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 639 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1973); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967).
30 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622, 641 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 527-32 (1973); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC,
557 F.2d 24, 25-30 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 479 F.
Supp. 1339, 1341-42 (D.N.J. 1979); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp.
1226, 1231-58 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974). See also Merger Guidelines
of Department of Justice, reprinted in [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4510, at 6881.
11 Assume, for example, that X corporation has a 20% market-share of the New York
City geographic market, and that Y and Z corporations claim, respectively, 30% and 50%
market-shares. Should P partnership acquire X corporation, the relative market-share per-
centages within the relevant market would not change, because X's market-share has merely
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tra-market relationship of the competitors, 2 the geographic mar-
ket extension merger is still subject to section 7 scrutiny.38 This is
so because the removal of the acquiring firm as a potential entrant
into the target's geographic market may have significant anticom-
petitive consequences." Indeed, the potential competition doctrine
recognizes that substantial competitive effects may be exerted
within a given geographic market by the imminent presence of a
firm on the fringe of such market.3 5
By analogy, albeit implicit, the Jim Walter Corp. court has
summarily elevated to threshold status a similar inquiry into com-
petitive effects-in this case, those exerted by the acquired corpo-
ration-for the purpose of defining the relevant geographic market.
In so doing, it is arguable that the Fifth Circuit has promulgated a
geographic market definition which is inconsistent with the tradi-
tional standard espoused by the Supreme Court.36 Although the
Court's guidelines for circumscribing a relevant geographic market
have not been static, even at their outermost boundary they have
never been as expansive as the Jim Walter Corp. perceptible com-
petitive impact test.37 The broadest relevant geographic market
been converted into P's market-share. Furthermore, the number of firms in the market
would not decrease, because the elimination by acquisition of X implies the entrance by
acquisition of P.
2 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532 (1973). After a firm
outside of a relevant geographic market enters into that market by means of merger or
acquisition, its competitive conduct "may be the mirror image of that of the acquired com-
pany." Id. On the other hand, of course, if the acquired firm is "operated at lower cost as
part of a large enterprise ... enabl[ing] it to drive less efficient smaller competitors out of
business," the acquisition may tend to reduce competition within the'relevant market. Tur-
ner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1313, 1322
(1965).
"3 Pursuant to the Celler-Kefauver amendment, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), all merg-
ers, however characterized, are subject to section 7 scrutiny. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949); note 1
supra.
34 In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), involving a conglomerate
merger of the product extension type, id. at 577, the Court listed several factors determina-
tive of whether removal of the acquiring firm as a potential entrant may have substantial
anticompetitive effects: whether firms within the relevant market are influenced by their
"predictions" of marketing activities by firms outside of that market; whether barriers to
entry are low; whether there are few potential competitors, so that entry by one would be
significant; and whether the acquiring firm is the most likely entrant. Id. at 581.
3' See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532 (1973); note 29 supra.
3' See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
37 See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra. Indeed, even the distributional test of
a relevant geographic market promulgated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 328 (1962), presupposes that the acquired firm actually operates within the defined
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adopted by the Supreme Court followed from utilization of a func-
tional test. This test presumed that the perimeter of the relevant
geographic market was dependent on several variables going to the
range of distribution of the relevant product.3 8 These variables in-
cluded transportation costs, the bulk and weight of the relevant
product, and -the uniqueness of the relevant product. 9 Subse-
quently, the Court held that a relevant geographic market is delin-
eated by the area in which an acquired firm markets its goods or
services and directly competes in commerce.40 What these tests
have in common is that they define a relevant geographic market
in terms of the area where merging firms operate and buyers seek
supplies, not in terms of pricing interdependence, or other compet-
itive impacts, between geographic regions. The Jim Walter Corp.
perceptible competitive impact test, on the other hand, does con-
sider inter-market economic effects in establishing a relevant geo-
graphic market.41 While the Fifth Circuit stated that such an ap-
proach finds support in the legislative history of section 742 and in
dicta in Marine Bancorporation," it is far from certain that the
market. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337 (1962).
39 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962).
39 Id.; see Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 817 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259
F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1958). Viewed from the consumer's perspective, the range of distri-
bution of a product or service is that area within which a "purchaser can practicably turn
for supplies." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (antitrust
action under section 3 of the Clayton Act).
40 See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 667 (1974); United States
v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 (1974). There may be more than one rele-
vant geographic market if, for example, the acquired firm markets its goods or services lo-
cally, regionally, and nationally. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
621 (1974).
41 625 F.2d at 682-83.
42 Id. at 682 (quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950)); see note 22 and
accompanying text supra.
43 625 F.2d at 682. The Jim Walter Corp. court acknowledged and, indeed, purported
to apply the current Supreme Court formulation of a relevant geographic market, which the
Marine Bancorporation Court characterized as the area of significant marketing activities
and of direct competition by the acquired firm. See id. (quoting United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974)). Jim Walter Corp. broadly interpreted
the meaning of significant marketing activities, however, adopting the perceptible competi-
tive impact test, which turns not on the availability of goods, but rather on interregional
economic effects. See 625 F.2d at 682. Jim Walter Corp. builds upon RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602
F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980) and United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). RSR found that a national relevant geo-
graphic market was supported by evidence of nationwide pricing interdependence. 602 F.2d
at 1323. Similarly, Bethlehem Steel held that the relevant geographic market includes the
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expansive market definition obtained under the perceptible com-
petitive impact standard is reconcilable with the judicial trend to
narrowly define the relevant geographic market.4'
A second, more practical problem which might preclude the
general acceptance of the test espoused in Jim Walter Corp. is the
nature of the inquiry required. Certainly, a relevant geographic
market defined by perceptible competitive impacts is more ab-
stract and, hence, more difficult to establish than a significant-
sales relevant market.45 One of the evidentiary predicates for a
finding of perceptible competitive impacts, according to Jim Wal-
ter Corp., is proof of regional market interrelatedness. 4 Definition
of a relevant geographic market in terms of regional market inter-
relatedness requires the court to utilize the economic theory gener-
ally known as cross-elasticity, which measures the effect of a
change in price of product X on the supply of or demand for prod-
uct y.47 Because elasticity is a function of interrelatedness between
several variables,48 definition of a relevant geographic market in
such terms is a complex task.49 In contrast, the traditional stan-
dard of delineating a relevant geographic market-the area of sig-
nificant sales or marketing activities-permits courts to readily de-
termine the area in which an acquired firm makes significant sales,
without engaging in complex economic analysis.5 Proceeding to
region "where the trade in a product is affected by, and is not independent of, the trade in
that product in other areas." 168 F. Supp. at 599-600.
4 See note 55 infra.
45 Cf. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970)
(substantial lessening of competition is more readily proved by market-share than by mar-
ket behavior).
46 625 F.2d at 682-83; see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576,
599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). When regional markets are interrelated-not independent of one
another-a rise in the price of product X in region A, for example, will increase the demand
for a substitute product in region B. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 432-33 (10th
ed. 1976).
47 C. AMMER & D. AMME, DIcTIoNARY OF BusIEss AND ECONOMICS 104 (1977).
48 D. ORR, PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GovwEwmr INTERVENTION 70 (1976).
49 An important assumption underlying cross-price elasticity analysis is that "all vari-
ables and parameters other than those being studied are fixed." D. NICHOLS & C. REYNOLDS,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 536 (1971). See L. ABoTr, ECONOMICS AND THE MODERN WORLD 9
(2d ed. 1967). This "ceteris paribus" assumption is fine in theory, but breaks down outside
of the classroom, complicating courtroom economic analysis. See generally M. BRENNAN,
TmoRY o, ECONOMC STATICS 28 (1965).
" See note 26 and accompanying text supra. The goal of the courts is to achieve sound,
practical, and consistent judicial administration. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). Indeed, one commentator attributes the Supreme Court's
failure to create "coherent and rational" rules of antitrust law to four factors: some Justices
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the second tier of section 7 analysis,"' it can then be determined
whether the acquisition substantially lessens competition within
the relevant market.5 2 If, in this regard, the acquiring firm is
outside of the area of significant sales, then, and only then, must
the court resort to the more economically oriented standard of re-
gional market interrelatedness, through application of potential
competition theory. 3
Despite the possibility of conflict between traditional Supreme
Court relevant geographic market guidelines and the Jim Walter
Corp. perceptible competitive impact standard, and notwithstand-
ing the complexity and subjectivity of the inquiry, it is submitted
that the Jim Walter Corp. test is justified as an alternative to the
significant-sales test. By allowing the Justice Department to chal-
lenge a merger which has anticompetitive effects outside of the tra-
ditionally delineated relevant geographic market, the perceptible
competitive impact test further implements the "any section of the
country" language of the Clayton Act.5' For example, assume that
are emotionally and ideologically hostile to "Big Business;" antitrust law may be too diffi-
cult for the Justices to accurately apply; the defense in an antitrust case typically accepts
the conceptual framework of the government's position without attempting to propose new
theories for ascertaining anticompetitive effects; and the Expediting Act, ch. 544, §§ 1-2, 32
Stat. 823 (1903) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 28-29 (1976)), impeded development of a
body of non-Supreme Court antitrust decisions by providing for direct appeal from the dis-
trict court to the Supreme Court. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition De-
cisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 326-27 (1975). Notably, the Antitrust Procedures and Penal-
ties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 4, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 28), which
substituted appeal to the circuit court for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, should result
in the development of a body of intermediate appellate case law, thus minimizing the signif-
icance of the fourth factor. Posner, supra, at 327 & n.154. See generally Jim Walter Corp. v.
FTC, 625 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1980); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
"1 See note 5 supra.
"2 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623-42 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-36 (1973). The potential competi-
tion theory itself has been attacked as an unwieldy concept. One commentator contends
that the doctrine should be discarded because it is difficult to identify and rank potential
entrants; there is no theoretical or empirical evidence establishing the minimum number of
potential competitors needed to affect competition within the relevant market; and there is
no evidence that the elimination of a potential competitor has ever had an adverse impact
on competition within a relevant market. R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcoNoMic PER-
SPECTIVE 122-24 (1976).
" See note 22 supra. It is suggested that the Celler-Kefauver amendment's insertion of
"section of the country" in place of the narrower "community" phraseology of the original
section 7 may have been intended solely to restrict section 7 actions to economically signifi-
cant regions, and that the section does not permit relevant geographic markets to be found
[Vol. 55:312
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X partnership markets milk and has significant sales in New York,
with perceptible competitive impacts on milk firms in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Assume also that Y partnership sells milk in
New Jersey and that Z partnership sells milk in Pennsylvania. Y
acquires X. The traditional significant-sales test, coupled with po-
tential competition theory, will allow for judging the impact of the
acquisition in New York. The effect on competition in Penn-
sylvania, however, would not ordinarily be subjected to scrutiny. If
the perceptible competitive impact test is applied, though, the rel-
evant geographic market will encompass Pennsylvania, and the
government for the first time may attempt to prove a substantial
lessening of competition in that region. Substantial anticompeti-
tive effects might result from the merger in the preceding hypo-
thetical if the following additional facts are established. Z partner-
ship perceived X partnership to be a likely entrant into the
Pennsylvania milk market. Accordingly, Z maintained low prices
for its dairy products. Z did not perceive Y partnership as a likely
entrant. The purchase of X by Y may dispel Z's perceived threat of
entry into its market by other firms. Z may then raise prices. Here,
the perceptible competitive impact test, operating in tandem with
the potential competition doctrine, could suffice to invalidate the
acquisition of X by Y should substantial lessening of competition
in Pennsylvania be proved.55 Thus, definition of the geographic
market in accordance with the perceptible competitive impact
standard would afford the means to define a geographic market
sufficiently broad to encompass the area of violation.
In addition to expanding the area in which the Justice Depart-
ment may seek to establish the existence of a section 7 violation,
the perceptible competitive impact test, if generally acceptedf can
be expected to have an impact on the second tier inquiry-whether
competition has been substantially lessened. In order to under-
stand this relationship, it is important to recognize at the outset
in any section of the country unless actual marketing activities are established.
55 But see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622 (1974),
where the Court held that "in a potential-competition case like this one, the relevant geo-
graphic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired firm
is an actual, direct competitor." Id. The extent to which this statement by the Supreme
Court forecloses use of the perceptible competitive impact test in a potential competition
case depends on the construction of Marine Bancorporation's "like this one" phraseology.
At least one circuit court has held that the definition of geographic market espoused in
Marine Bancorporation should be limited to a highly regulated local industry. RSR Corp. v.
FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
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that, although the substantiality standard applies to all types of
mergers-horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate 5 -the tests of
substantiality differ. For example, horizontal mergers, involving
combinations between firms operating in identical relevant product
and geographic markets,5 7 are usually judged by market-share sta-
tistics.58 In such mergers, market-share may suffice without other
evidence as proof of undue concentration and may establish a
prima facie case of a section 7 violation. The percentage of mar-
ket-share which properly may be regarded as undue is smaller if
the market exhibits a trend toward concentration. 0 Market-share
statistics are also of use in analyzing conglomerate mergers," but
because there are no preexisting direct economic relationships be-
tween the acquiring and acquired firms, the more subjective poten-
tial competition test is utilized. 2
"' FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
01 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-35 (1962). To characterize a
merger as horizontal, the acquired and acquiring firms must have been competitors prior to
the merger. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
see Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982
(1978); United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1977).
" See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 495-98 (1974); United States v. Continental
Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 504 & n.13, 505-08
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
" See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120, 123 (1975); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-98 (1974); United States v. Phllipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970). Once a prima facie case of substantial
lessening of competition is established through a showing of undue market-share, it is in-
cumbent upon the acquiring firm to prove that such statistics falsely depict the acquisition's
probable effect on competition. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120
(1975).
01 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276-78 (1966); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 & n.72 (1962).
61 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571-73, 575 (1967); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 73 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). In
Kennecott Copper Corp., a copper producer acquired Peabody Coal Company, one of two
leading coal producers and distributors in the United States. 467 F.2d at 69. The relevant
product market was bituminous, sub-bituminous, and lignite coal. Id. at 70. The relevant
geographic market was the entire United States. Id. at 71. Hence, the merger was of the
conglomerate product market extension variety. While invalidating the acquisition, the
court looked to the market-share of firms in the coal industry, id. at 73, and concluded that
the relevant product market was tending toward greater concentration. Id. at 79. Addition-
ally, the court applied the potential competition theory, basing its decision, in part, on the
fact that Kennecott was a likely entrant into the coal product market. Id.
01 See Shea, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerate Firm: "A Rose is a Rose is a
Rose," in CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQUISmONs: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 533, 535 (Special Ed. 1970). Other devices also are utilized to determine whether a
conglomerate merger produces substantial anticompetitive effects. These include potential
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Hence, it should be apparent that the characterization of a
merger is largely determinative of the standard of substantiality to
be applied. 3 The characterization of a merger, it must be
remembered, is a function of market definition.6 4 To the extent
that the perceptible competitive impact test defines a different,
and usually more expansive market than obtains under the tradi-
tional significant-sales test, use of the new approach may trans-
form a merger previously characterized as a conglomerate geo-
graphic market extension merger under the significant-sales
approach into a horizontal merger. This can be illustrated as fol-
lows. Assume that Panacon Corporation markets products
throughout the west coast. Its operations, however, have nation-
wide perceptible competitive impacts. Assume also that JWC, a
corporation intent on acquiring Panacon, operates exclusively on
the east coast. If, then, a western relevant geographic market is
defined in accordance with the traditional standard of significant
sales by the acquired firm, a merger between JWC and Panacon
would be of the geographic market extension type and, thus, the
potential competition doctrine would be employed to determine its
legality. If, however, a national relevant geographic market is de-
fined under the Jim Walter Corp. standard of perceptible competi-
tive impacts, a merger between JWC and Panacon would be of the
horizontal variety and, therefore, the second tier inquiry would in-
volve the more objective market-share investigation.
It is submitted that when a conglomerate merger is converted
into a horizontal merger merely through utilization of a broad rele-
vant geographic market test, such as perceptible competitive im-
pacts, the market-share which may properly be regarded as undue
should be greater than that which would suffice had the market
been defined and the merger characterized pursuant to the signifi-
cant sales test. Indeed, the effect of increased concentration is di-
rect in a significant-sales horizontal merger, since the acquired and
acquiring firms are competing for the same buyers. Market-share,
reciprocity, id., see FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965), and the
tendency of the merger to raise barriers to entry, see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 578-79 & n.3 (1967). See also 3 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 19.02[2], [3], [11] & [12] (1980).
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 587 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("different sets of circumstances may call for fundamentally different tests of substantial
anticompetitive effect").
See generally 2 J. VON KAuNOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 17.01
(1980); 3 id. § 18.02.
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:312
in this situation, is highly relevant, 5 and even a low combined
market-share could properly trigger section 7 sanctions." The ef-
fect of increased market-share, however, is somewhat indirect in a
perceptible-competitive-impact horizontal merger, because the ac-
quired and acquiring firms are competing for different buyers.
Hence, the increased market-share generated by the merger is not
composed of a greater share of buyers within the same buyer pool,
but rather is an aggregation of shares of independent buyer pools.
Thus, it is suggested that the quantum of market-share deemed
undue in a perceptible-competitive-impact horizontal merger
should be greater than that deemed undue in a significant-sales
horizontal merger.
Notably, in addition to bearing upon the substantiality stan-
dard to be applied, the characterization of a merger frequently is
determinative of whether the Justice Department will challenge
the acquisition. Indeed, the Department of Justice has developed
guidelines for judging whether mergers or acquisitions are in viola-
tion of section 7.8 The guidelines vary in accordance with the type
of merger.88 For example, horizontal mergers generally are chal-
"I See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1962). Market-share is "one
of the most important factors" in judging the anticompetitive effects flowing from a merger.
Id. Indeed, in several horizontal merger cases, the Supreme Court has focused almost en-
tirely on market-share and industry concentration. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270, 276-78 (1966). See generally 3 J. VON KALINOwsKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE
REGULATION § 19.02[3][a] (1980). But see United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486, 498 (1974) (market-share, while of great significance, is not conclusive).
"6 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Low market-share is
sufficient to trigger section 7 prohibitions when other factors are present, such as a trend
towards greater market concentration, or when the acquiring firm is a national chain. Id. at
344-45.
'7 Merger guidelines of Department of Justice, reprinted in [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 5 4510. The Justice Department's merger guidelines commence with a statement that
they are intended to "acquaint the business community," and others, with current Depart-
ment of Justice standards for challenging acquisitions or mergers under section 7. Id. The
necessity of publicizing such information was emphasized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), wherein it was stated that "unless
businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound
business planning is retarded." Id. at 362. For an example of reliance on the Justice Depart-
ment guidelines during prosecution of a section 7 action, see Stanley Works v. FTC, 469
F.2d 498, 504 n.13, 505 n.16 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
'8 In the case of horizontal mergers, the Justice Department guidelines provide that
'such mergers will not be challenged unless the combined market-share of the four largest
firms in the market is approximately 75% or more and the combined market-share of the
acquired and acquiring firms is greater than or equal to 8%. Merger Guidelines of Depart-
ment of Justice, reprinted in [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6883-85. Alterna-
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lenged by the Department when the acquiring and acquired firms
possess a combined share of at least 8% of the market.6 9 Conglom-
erate mergers of the geographic market extension type are chal-
lenged when the acquired firm has approximately a 25% market-
share and the acquiring firm is a likely de novo entrant into the
acquired firm's geographic market.70 The choice of which guide-
lines to apply, and hence the choice of which suits to prosecute,
requires a characterization of the merger. To the extent that
merger characterization is a function of the manner in which the
geographic market is defined, the standard used to define the mar-
ket may determine, at least under the present guidelines, whether
the government will challenge a particular acquisition.7 1 For exam-
ple, assume with reference to the preceding hypothetical that
Panacon's share of the west coast market was 93 %, but its share of
the nationwide market was only 3 %. Assume also that JWC, oper-
ating entirely on the east coast, commands 4% of the national
market. Under the traditional significant-sales test, the merger
would be characterized as geographic market extension. Therefore,
since Panacon's share of the west coast geographic market is above
the Justice Department's threshold of 25%, the merger would be
contested by the government. If, on the other hand, the Jim Wal-
ter Corp. test was utilized to define the geographic market, the
merger would be of the horizontal variety, and apparently would
escape challenge by the Justice Department, at least under current
standards, since the combined JWC-Panacon market-share is less
than 8%. Nevertheless, since the gravamen of the conduct is realis-
tically unaffected by the definition of the market, the Justice De-
partment can be expected to contest such acquisition. Hence, it is
submitted that if the perceptible competitive impact test is gener-
tively, if the combined market-share of the four largest firms is less than 75%, the Justice
Department will not prosecute unless the combined market-share of the acquired and ac-
quiring firms is 10% or more. Id.
In the case of geographic market extension mergers, the Justice Department generally
will not challenge such mergers unless the acquiring firm is a likely entrant into the relevant
market and the acquired firm possesses a 25% share of the market. Id.
6, See note 68 supra.
70 Id.
7' The decision to prosecute has been important since the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice had "an unbroken string of successes in the Supreme Court in the
1950's and 1960's." Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Bur-
ger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 881 (1976). In the 1970's, however, the government lost sev-
eral important cases. Id. (citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602
(1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)).
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ally accepted, fairness demands that the government develop and
publish an alternative set of guidelines, reflecting the broader rele-
vant geographic market within which a section 7 violation can be
established.
CONCLUSION
The perceptible competitive impact test promulgated by Jim
Walter Corp. as an alternative to the significant sales test repre-
sents a useful addition to section 7 analysis, notwithstanding that
it defines a relevant geographic market which is broader than that
heretofore formulated by the Supreme Court and that it requires
an initial subjective assessment of competitive effects. It is not sug-
gested, however, that the perceptible competitive impact test
should supplant the traditional significant-sales test. Indeed, in
most cases the significant-sales test should continue as the stan-
dard by which a relevant geographic market is defined since it is
less subjective and more susceptible to consistent application than
the Jim Walter Corp. evidentiary standard of regional market in-
terrelatedness which, in essence depends on a regional cross-elas-
ticity test.7 2
The Jim Walter Corp. perceptible competitive impact test is
justified, however, as an alternative to the significant-sales test for
delimiting a relevant geographic market when it permits scrutiny
of mergers that have substantial anticompetitive effects outside of
the traditional relevant market. It must be recognized, though,
that acceptance of the perceptible competitive impact test requires
the modification of several of the established ground rules of sec-
tion 7 proceedings-such as the criteria for determining which
mergers the government will protest and the level of market-share
deemed undue in a perceptible-competitive-impact horizontal
merger-to accommodate the theory.
G. Clifford Korn
72 625 F.2d at 682-83; see notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
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